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4 October 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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
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- [Redacted]
- 2. Congo: Adoula remains opposed to military operations against Katanga, although Congolese army leaders continue to work on plans for attack. (*Page iii*)
- 3. France: Next French nuclear test series (underground) reportedly to begin in November. (*Page iii*)

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Congo: [Premier Adoula remains reluctant to undertake military operations against Katanga. He told Ambassador Gullion on 2 October that in order to quiet the "activists" in his cabinet he had threatened to resign. Congolese army leaders are, however, reportedly engaged in making plans for a much larger attack on Katanga than they had previously envisioned. The plan is to involve nine battalions, including three from Orientale Province commanded by General Lunda.]

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[The Congolese command has no training in large-scale military operations, transport and logistic facilities are inadequate, and liaison between Mobutu's Leopoldville headquarters and the various army components is tenuous. Should the operation get under way, it probably would bog down long before its objectives were accomplished. The resulting deterioration in the effectiveness of Mobutu's troops would pose new security problems for the Adoula government.]

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(Map)

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France: [The next French nuclear test series reportedly will begin in November at a new test site in the south-central Sahara near Bordj in Eker. The tests will be held underground. [the first test will be of small yield, but it will be followed by increasingly larger explosions. [France

would have "a tested nuclear bomb" and a delivery capability by the end of the year. The series of tests is reportedly aimed at increasing the yield of a bomb designed to fit the new Mirage IV strike bomber, which is now undergoing pre-production tests.]

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(Map on reverse of page)]

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
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DAILY BRIEF

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4 Oct 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

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Situation in the Congo

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 [Reports from Leopoldville and Elisabethville indicate that both the UN and the Katangans are confident of their military superiority. UN commander McKeown, in a 30 September conversation with Ambassador Gullion, expressed confidence concerning the command's future activities in Katanga. He ascribed the UN's present posture mainly to an unwillingness, based on humanitarian considerations, to go on the offensive. He deprecated the Katangan "attacks," which he said were actually ill-directed mortar and small-arms fire; he asserted they could not be termed offensive operations. McKeown indicated he was sure that with the addition of a small jet fighter capability, the arrival of twenty armored personnel carriers, and some regrouping of forces, the UN would have the Katangan situation in hand.]

The American Consulate in Elisabethville, while confirming the existence of an attitude among UN troops that "next time we shall finish the job we started last time," reports that the UN Elisabethville headquarters has no intelligence organization. Moreover, UN troops have been ostracized by Europeans and by Katangan officials and thus have little chance to gain information by informal contacts. The consulate adds, however, that the local UN representatives seem to be going ahead with a plan whose details they refuse to divulge. They apparently continue to feel that the Katangan forces are impotent with or without their white officers.

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 The consulate reports that on the Katangan side there is a mixture of confusion and outspoken confidence, with much talk of a "last-ditch stand" and "whipping the UN again." There is a widespread feeling that guerrilla warfare is inevitable if fighting breaks out again, [and the white mercenaries who remain in the Katanga forces reportedly are being reorganized in small, guerrilla-type units. The Katanga government reportedly is also distributing small arms to Africans throughout southern Katanga.]

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